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The stakeholder management literature is dominated by the 'shareholder 
value' and 'inclusive stakeholder' views of the corporation.  Each views the 
governance problem in terms of inter-functional conflicts between stakeholder 
groups such as between investors and managers or managers and employees and 
rests on the assumption of an idealized corporate structure characterized by the 
separation of ownership from management. Our review of corporate governance 
and stakeholder conflict shows that such functional based characterization is too 
simplistic and fails to account for important intra-functional conflict. Through a 
comparative review that considers managerial, stakeholder and family systems of 
governance, we demonstrate that while the modality of conflict varies by system, 
substantial intra-functional conflict is endemic to each. We integrate the findings of 
the agency and comparative stakeholder theories of corporate governance to offer 
an authority based framework with three different governance structures that offers 
complementary insights into stakeholder conflicts. Thus, our study highlights the 
important, but often neglected intra-stakeholder type of conflict in 
various organizations and provides a basis for understanding their various 
manifestations and consequences under the different systems of governance. 
 
 






Beggars do not envy millionaires, though of course they will envy other beggars who are more 
successful.  
-Bertrand Russell 
Russell’s observation on the resentment that can attend those sharing the same condition 
reminds us of a point all but forgotten in the management stakeholder literature, namely that 
stakeholders who seemingly share a common fate are frequently in conflict with one another. 
Rather than united in common cause against a more powerful other, like brothers in arms, they 
can be more like Cain and Abel, jealously divided against one another. Contemporary corporate 
governance is primarily concerned with conflicts between stakeholder groups, such as owners, 
workers, and managers, or what Wolfe and Putler (2002: 298) describe as role-based  stakeholder 
groups.   Conversely, we show in this paper that the corporate governance literature identifies 
settings for numerous conflicts within stakeholder groups or intra-stakeholder conflicts, such as 
those among owners (Bergloff & von Thadden 1994; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman 
2002) or creditors. However, while there are several compelling explanations of inter-
stakeholder conflicts, such as agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) or class politics (Roe 1994), there 
is no comparable account of intra-stakeholder conflict.  
We address the issue of intra-stakeholder conflict from the perspective of an authority 
approach. Through a comparative review that considers managerial, stakeholder, and family 
systems of governance, we show how patterns of authority inherent in each in system privileges 
by according salience to distinct classes of stakeholders and increases their capacity to achieve 
their interests. In this regard corporations can be understood as venues for distributional contests 
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among stakeholders (Edwards 1979; Fiss & Zajac 2004). The idea that firms are venues for 
distributional contests will surprise few readers yet this aspect of governance is rarely 
investigated.  Indeed, Hinings and Greenwood claim that management theory has lost interest in 
how ‘privilege and disadvantage are distributed within organizations’ (2002: 411). With a focus 
upon incentive alignment, managerial oversight, and codes of practice - much corporate 
governance research focuses on mitigating inter-stakeholder conflict with a view to maximizing 
corporate performance and firm value (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya 2003). Yet 
phenomena such as minority shareholder expropriation, executive salary premia, opaque 
accounting practices, unfunded pension liabilities, and related party transactions indicate that 
value is often appropriated and redistributed among stakeholders before it appears in bottom line 
performance measures (Coff 1999). Recurrent corporate scandals highlight the contested nature of 
stakeholder relationships as they periodically propel corporate governance practice into the mainstream 
of political debate.   
We propose that intra-stakeholder conflicts are inherent in the functioning of a firm and 
because stakeholder primacy varies with the governance system, so does the very definition of 
governance issues – whether as a means of resolving conflicts, or being the very cause of the 
conflict. The fundamental issue of corporate governance is not simply one of protecting 
shareholders from managers, rather the issue is one of determining stakeholder distribution 
rights, describing inter-stakeholder tensions, and identifying the means through which the 
primary stakeholders seek to preserve their privilege and externalize the costs of those privileges 
onto less powerful secondary stakeholders. 
One intended contribution of this paper is to advance the idea that ‘above the bottom line’ value 
distributions to stakeholders depend decisively upon a firm’s corporate governance system. Such 
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contests among stakeholders to capture value can be manifest in either financial or non-financial gains 
or losses.  For example, executives may prefer to take value in the form of perks (Zajac & 
Westphal 1994) and employees may seek compensation through job security, flexible terms of 
employment, vacation time or career development opportunities. In this respect we seek to explain 
stakeholder salience, which is ‘the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder 
claims’(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood 1997: 854). Whereas Mitchell et al (1997) propose that salience is a 
function of stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency we argue that stakeholder salience 
is influenced largely at the firm level by attributes of its corporate governance.  
In the following sections, we briefly review existing perspectives on inter and intra 
stakeholder conflicts in the governance literature highlighting the shortcomings therein. 
Subsequently, we develop the notion of authority based governance systems and demonstrate 
how it can be used to shed new light on intra-stakeholder conflicts. Thereafter, we review 
literature linking stakeholder salience peculiar to each governance system, and conclude with 
suggestions for future research.  
2 Inter- and intra-stakeholder conflict  
2.1 Agency Perspective 
The prevailing perspective on corporate governance is agency theory which holds that 
differences in owner and manager interests arising out of the separation of ownership and 
control, constitutes the major stakeholder conflict in the modern corporation (Jensen 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling 1976). While separation of ownership and control represents an efficient 
specialization of function (Fama & Jensen 1983) professional managers with little or no 
ownership stake in the firms they manage make decisions on behalf of shareholders but have 
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little incentive to manage the firm efficiently, or in a manner consistent the interests of its 
shareholders. The solution to the conflict is essentially contractual in nature: namely executive 
compensation through incentive contracts combined with board and stock-market oversight 
(Useem 1993). In this shareholder value maximization conception of the firm, contractual 
solutions are recommended and extended to other stakeholders wherein each of the firms’ 
constituencies, “labor, capital, suppliers, customers, the community, and management- … are 
better advised to perfect their relations to the firm at the contracting interface at which the firm 
and their constituents strike their main bargain” (Williamson 1985: 298). Such a solution 
conceives of the firm as little more than a nexus of contracts (Williamson, Aoki, & Gustafsson 
1990) in which inter-stakeholder relations are expected to be inherently adversarial (Roe, 1994).  
Notwithstanding the growing normative acceptance for shareholder value maximization, 
at the heart of the managerial governance model is the expectation that managers will continue to 
serve themselves first{Hansmann, 2004 #8597}. The tension between shareholders and 
managers over value allocation has lately shifted away from the design of incentives toward the 
intensification of monitoring and accountability. Much formal governance reform is crisis driven 
(Coffee 2000) and the recent scandals in the US have created a momentum for legislative 
change. US legislation such the Sarbanes Oxley act of 2002 that strengthens disclosure 
requirements was enacted in the wake several corporate scandals in which executives were 
manifestly manipulating incentive systems in their own favor. However, stronger reporting 
requirements is not always in the interest of some organizations, for example, information 
disclosure by high-tech firms may harm their competitive positions, and disclosure can also 
hinder the restructuring of mature enterprises. Consequently, intensified disclosure requirements 
may have precipitated a move toward private equity (Engela, Hayes, & Wang 2007). Behind the 
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movement toward private equity is the intent to strengthen equity holders’ claim over residual 
value and does little to improve outcomes for other stakeholders.  
 Thus, while the focus of agency driven governance is the conflict between stakeholder 
groups, there are a few instances of assessment of intra-stakeholder conflicts. The tension 
between creditors and equity holders is well documented (Harris & Raviv 1991; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976) wherein the debt contract gives equity holders an incentive to invest sub 
optimally. However the agency theorists’ concern still remains minimizing managerial 
opportunism, and the recommendations focus on the optimization of debt holding by trading off 
the “agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt” (Harris & Raviv, 1991: 301).  
Recent literature also points towards the potential of conflict between majority and 
minority equity holders, commonly known as the Principal-Principal Agency (PPA) or Type 2 
agency concerns, especially in the context of emerging economies (Dharwadkar, George, & 
Brandes 2000), and dual class shareholding (Jarrell & Poulsen 1988). There are also a few 
studies looking at the difference in outcome preferences between different types of owners 
(Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), and long-term (pension fund) and short-term (mutual-fund) 
investors (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman 2002). However, the underlying governance 
concern remains the agency driven maximization of shareholders’ return and/or minimization of 
managerial self-serving behavior. 
This view of inter-stakeholder tensions has much to recommend it but it is partial and 
oversimplified. Our comparative review of governance systems suggests a more fine-grained 
perspective that identifies and highlights numerous intra-stakeholder tensions, for example, 
between minority and controlling investors, equity investors and creditors, knowledge workers 
and routine workers, senior and new employees, owner-managers and professional managers, 
9 
 
and insider and arm's-length buyer/suppliers. Different governance systems privilege distinct 
classes of shareholders in terms of their capacity to achieve their investment goals, monitor 
performance, and enforce their claims (Thomsen & Pedersen 2000). Similarly, governance 
systems also differ in their tendencies to accommodate bargaining and power dynamics that in 
turn influence stakeholders’ abilities to extract firm value.  
 
2.2 Stakeholder theory perspective 
Traditional approaches to stakeholder management tend to view distributional contests in 
terms of gross role-based categories (Wolfe & Putler 2002) such as tensions between investor 
and employee outcomes  or between management and employees (Freeman 1984; Pfeffer 1994).  
These role-based stakeholder groups are assumed to share similar priorities and interests within 
the group. Ironically, Freeman (1984) the doyen of stakeholder theory, has warned against 
assuming homogeneity of interests among such groups and argued that stakeholder theory ought 
to identify specific points of differentiation within seemingly homogenous groups. However, 
only very few studies have gone beyond generic role-based definitions - the majority assume 
homogeneity of interests and priorities within role-based stakeholder groups (Wolfe & Putler, 
2002). While the stakeholder management concept promises insight on how managers might 
balance their responsibilities to shareholders and other interests who hold a legitimate stake in 
the firm (Freeman 1984), the reconciliation of competing claims has proven difficult.  
In particular, the logic of shareholder wealth maximization has been inhospitable to the 
stakeholder a view of the firm.  One key text declares “mutually beneficial stakeholder 
relationships can enhance the wealth-creating capacity of the corporation” (Post, Preston, & 
Sachs 2002: 36). However, empirical support for this view is mixed (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & 
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Jones 1999; Donaldson & Preston 1995; Hillman & Keim 2001; McGuire, Sundgren, & 
Schneeweis 1988). In addition, critics of stakeholder theory point out that managers in “such 
systems have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions” (Jensen, 2002). Furthermore, 
stakeholder theorists, especially proponents of normative and instrumental approaches often 
become embroiled in arid debates about the primacy of shareholder wealth maximization versus 
a broader conception of business ethics (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar 2004; Sundaram & Inkpen 
2004). In this respect, descriptive stakeholder theory scholars focus almost exclusively upon 
stakeholder outcomes in the publicly-held firm where important corporate decisions are made by 
professional managers (Jones & Wicks 1999). By focusing upon single corporate type, such 
research on stakeholder theory essentially holds corporate governance as a constant. In so doing, 
significant variation in stakeholder and organizational outcomes in other systems of governance 
are overlooked.   
To summarize, theories of corporate governance typically adopt either an 
agency/shareholder (Jensen 2000) or stakeholder/socio-political approach (Fligstein 2001) to 
address issues of performance and efficiency. Table 1 highlights the key findings and major 
differences between these perspectives.   
--------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
The agency or shareholder-centric approaches focus upon questions relating to the 
incentives and allocation of decision rights among managers and providers of capital (Jensen 
1998) and are preoccupied with addressing a narrow range of agency problems stemming from 
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that relationship. On the other hand, socio-political approaches adopt a wider perspective 
invoking society (Fligstein, 2001), politics (Gourevitch & Shinn 2005), class (Roe 2003), and 
history (Bebchuk & Roe 1999) to explain continuing differences in national systems of corporate 
governance. While possessing great face validity socio-political approaches to governance often 
say very little about the practice of administration (Aguilera & Jackson 2003). We reason that to 
the extent that agency theories reduce to a concern with dyadic relations in the absence of 
context, and because socio-political theories reify the host society, then both streams flow away 
from a concern with organizations, their primary activities and purposes, and the distribution of 
outcomes for the stakeholders. 
To address the issue of stakeholder conflict we adopt an organization-centric and 
comparative governance approach that puts the firm at the center of its analysis (Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson 2008). We describe our perspective as an authority approach that 
incorporates elements of both agency and socio-political theories of corporate governance. 
Whereas Aguilera et al’s (2008) approach focuses upon the costs and contingencies of particular 
corporate governance practices; we focus instead on the effects on stakeholders of the 
authoritative hierarchical order inherent in any governance system. In the following section, we 
elaborate on our authority based governance model, grounding it in existing literature and 
highlight how this approach might be better positioned to explain intra-stakeholder conflicts.  
 
3 An authority based approach to governance 
Our authority-based approach addresses a long-standing debate in the stakeholder management 
literature. This literature has reached an impasse between advocates of ‘shareholder value’ and 
‘inclusive stakeholder’ views of the corporation (Jensen 2002; Kochan & Rubinstein 2000). The 
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academic stalemate rests on the assumption of a singular, idealized corporate structure 
characterized by the separation ownership and management, which ignores the diversity of 
corporate governance systems found around the world.  On the other hand, the varieties of 
capitalism literature (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002; Whitley, 
1999) sheds light on important institutional-level issues such as the incidence and prevalence of 
governance types in particular societies and their implications for national competitiveness. 
However, there are limits to the extent to which institutions can explain patterns of corporate 
governance (Roe 2003). This is because de jure formal institutions often have little de facto 
impact on administrative practice (Khanna, Kogan, & Palepu 2003).  Moreover, comparative 
approaches to corporate governance typically assume that each variety of capitalism will produce 
an ‘emblematic firm’ (Boyer 2005), such as the widely-held managerial enterprise, that will 
predominate in liberal market economies.  
Our authority approach to corporate governance recognizes the heterogeneity of 
corporate governance systems within any particular institutional context. For example, while the 
widely-held managerial enterprise is prevalent in liberal market economies there is also 
significant presence of private equity-held managerial enterprise and a long tradition of family-
controlled firms (Anderson & Reeb 2003). In practice, within any institutional architecture there 
will typically exist a plurality of ‘pure’ and ‘hybridized’ governance systems that consist of 
combinations of formal, rationally designed or selected instruments and informal, socially 
structured elements that ‘bundle’ together in various ways (Young, Peng, Ahlstrohm, Bruton, & 
Jiang 2008). Some governance bundles are socially or economically infeasible and rarely found 
whereas other governance bundles become prevalent and diffuse across societies. Our 
comparative review focuses upon stakeholder salience under three systems: managerial, 
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stakeholder, and family governance. Other systems of governance such as not-for-profit or co-
operative ownership certainly do exist, but the three systems reviewed here appear to be the most 
prevalent in capitalist economies (De Jong, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999). In addition, government 
or state controlled enterprises though commonly found are not considered in this review, as 
governance in such entities is more a function of geo-political and national agendas, rather than 
fundamental business principles. 
Each governance system differs with respect to efficiency and performance 
characteristics but we do not to enter into the debate about the causes of diffusion and prevalence 
of governance systems in particular societies, rather our purpose is to describe the organizational 
link between governance and stakeholder salience. Our authority approach is inductive and 
recognizes that ‘particular configurations of hierarchy-market relations’ (Whitley 1992) 
constitute systems of governance that have become prevalent and institutionalized in capitalist 
economies. Systems of governance determine how authority is shared and allocated within 
organizations. Authority sharing is the extent to which ‘owners and top managers delegate 
considerable discretion over task performance to skilled employees (and) with suppliers, 
customers and competitors in varied inter-firm networks {Whitley, 2007 #11338}(Whitley, 
2007: 149).  In this regard authority may be widely shared among the firm’s internal and external 
stakeholders or centralized in the hands of a single individual.   
 
In managerial governance, ownership and management control is separated and but 
professional managers’ discretionary authority is bounded by a series of checks and balances and 
managers must justify their actions on the basis of shareholder welfare (Charkham 1994). 
Authority most widely shared under stakeholder governance, ownership and management control 
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is separated but executives of a focal firm share authority with external stakeholders such as 
buyer/suppliers and capital providers who make mutual commitments to one another thereby 
embedding control in a network of enduring relationships. Stakeholder governance also delegates 
significant discretion over task organization to skilled employees and typically invites their 
participation in decision-making processes{Whitley, 2007 #11338}. Stakeholder governance is 
often referred to as “insider”, or “network” governance (Charkham 1994) and is sometimes 
equated with either the Japanese, or Germanic systems in which complex and durable inter-
corporate networks have featured prominently. Due to its decoupling from stock-market 
oversight and long term relational linkages with a main bank and employee groups in the form of 
lifetime employment and employee co-determination, stakeholder governance most 
approximates what scholars would identify as the stakeholder model of the firm (Sabel 2004).   
In family governance, managerial authority and capital provision are concentrated and in 
the hands of the same individuals. The exercise of authority is largely unchecked since owner-
managers are making decisions with their own money (i.e. exercising their property rights). The 
concentration of authority enables the firm to serve as an instrument that reflects the personal 
value systems of the entrepreneur and family members (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze 2005; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz 2001). Owner-managers decisions do not need to be 
justified to outsiders and because they view the firm as ‘our business’ (Demsetz & Lehn 1985) 
they may project their own idiosyncratic vision onto the business (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma 
1999).   
The structure of authority also dictates the contracting mode, which refers to prescribed 
norms about the way business transactions are conducted. Contracting mode varies in terms of 
whether transactions between the firm and resource providers are regulated by arm’s length 
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formal rules, or more tacit agreements and relational norms (Macneil 1978; Poppo & Zenger 
2002). The former reflects a highly calculative rationality wherein actors ‘attempt to consider all 
possible means to an end and weigh the alternative means in a decision making calculus’ 
(Biggart & Delbridge 2004: 11).  Managerial governance tends towards the arm's length side of 
this dimension and emphasize making transactions publicly transparent and on the establishment 
of formal mechanisms for enforcing contracts and settling disputes (Biggart & Delbridge 2004). 
Stakeholder governance relies more extensively on relational contracting among its resource 
providers and transactions are governed by tacit agreements, and socially embedded practices 
with unspecified time horizons (Hamilton & Biggart 1988; Ring & Van De Ven 1992). Under 
family governance, owner-managers have greater freedom to exercise their discretion in utilizing 
either contracting mode. Owner managers can use their social capital to transact in their social 
networks for financial and managerial resources, and business opportunities (Carney 2005). 
Alternatively, owner-managers may adopt a highly instrumental and arm’s length approach to 
contracting (Uzzi 1997). In the following sections, we elaborate further on each governance 
system and the stakeholder salience specific to it. 
 
4. Governance systems and stakeholder salience  
The salience of stakeholder claims on management attention has been viewed as a stakeholder 
attribute (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood 1997). In contrast, our authority approach proposes that firm 
corporate governance will determine an enduring legally prescribed and/or socially sanctioned 
stakeholder hierarchy regarding the rights and claims to the value created by the firm. 
Stakeholder salience specifies primacy or ‘who really benefits’ from the firm’s activities through 
kinds of rewards and incentives that can be legally and legitimately attained under specific 
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governance systems. In the following sections we distinguish between primary and secondary 
stakeholders and show how the stakeholder hierarchy engenders an array of both inter and intra 
stakeholder conflicts that are endemic to specific systems of governance.  
4.1 Stakeholder outcomes under managerial governance  
The great virtue of managerial governance is its capacity to simultaneously provide 
equity investors with the liquidity of their capital and participation in returns from long-term 
investment. It is this dual shareholder benefit that lies behind large liquid capital markets that 
allow for the emergence and persistence of managerial governance (Rappaport 1990). Firms 
characterized by managerial governance make greater use of public equity markets than other 
types of firms. Thus, the majority of capital is supplied by diversified arm’s length suppliers who 
are concerned with returns on their portfolios rather than the performance of any one investment 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  
The primary role-based stakeholder conflict is between equity investors and executives. 
The authority structure arising from separated ownership and management vests strategic 
decision rights with professional managers who serve as agents for widely dispersed and 
diversified shareholders and to whom they hold a fiduciary duty. However, arm’s length 
investors are vulnerable insofar as they have neither the ability, nor by virtue of their small 
holdings in any one firm, the incentive to monitor managers (Kester 1992). This core agency 
problem recognizes that the interests of managers and shareholders diverge in certain 
circumstances suggest that salaried executives tend to pursue expansion strategies and/or consume 
a variety of perquisites that benefit them at the expense of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). Due to its delegated authority, structure professional managers possess access to critical 
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information and tacit knowledge of the firms operations and have significant opportunity to 
capture value. 
To contain potential agency problems in managerial controlled firms, an array of capital 
market instruments and agencies have emerged to redress the power of managers. Fligstein 
(2001) describes the ideology behind these developments as the rise of the shareholder value 
conception of control and its principal mechanism is an active market for corporate control to 
constrain managers. Factors such as the rise of institutional investors, the growth of 
blockholding, and active-private equity firms are designed to mitigate the free-rider tendencies of 
dispersed ownership. Acting collectively these institutional agents are unencumbered by any 
loyalty to a specific family or company and are able to extract greater value than they had been 
receiving under the ‘unchallenged rule of managerial capitalism’ (Useem, 1993: 237). Yet these 
institutional investors also have the potential of agency issues  wherein the fund managers might 
make suboptimal decisions for their shareholders (Woidtke 2002).  
In the past few decades there were attempts to align investor-manager incentives through 
stock options or similar mechanisms that make a portion of top executive pay contingent upon stock 
market performance (Hall & Liebman 1998). However, many factors outside the control of 
executives can influence corporate financial performance (Finkelstein 1992). Thus, a potential 
cost to executives of being remunerated largely based on performance incentives is that they 
must assume some downside risk in compensation that is not attributable to their ability or effort 
levels. These executives also face a serious threat of dismissal if market returns are viewed as 
unsatisfactory (Walsh & Seward 1990).  
Attempts to minimize employment risk suggest managers will seek control over their 
firms' compensation processes and negotiate the structure of their compensation so that vesting 
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and capitalization occur in the near term (Combs & Skill 2003). Executives may also capture 
value in the form of selectively designed incentive compensation (Porac, Wade, & Pollock 
1999), or by back-dated grants of stock options (Arya & Sun 2004; Lie 2005). In the US that the 
vast majority of stock-options are cashed on vesting (Blasi, Kruse, & Bernstein 2003). Thus, 
equity linked executive compensation can also be part of the agency problem itself. For example, 
managers may divert value to themselves through a variety of mechanisms, such as self-dealing 
and insider trading (Bebchuk & Jolls 1999) or managers may adopt but not implement the 
substance of long term incentive plans by symbolically managing shareholder perceptions and 
decoupling external and internal processes (Westphal & Zajac 1998). Whereas shareholders 
possess a legal claim on firm value, they are primary stakeholders, but senior executives also 
achieve primacy due to an authority structure that accords them sufficient power to pursue their 
interests. 
Secondary stakeholders: Because executives who wish to access capital on public markets on 
the most favorable terms they may find it necessary to accommodate suppliers of financial 
capital and the exercise of this imperative often come at the expense of suppliers and employees. 
Under managerial governance, secondary stakeholders’ outcomes are attained through 
calculative arms-length contracts contractual means. Managerially governed firms tend to utilize 
instrumental pay-for performance systems for employees that heavily weight rewards toward 
specific behaviors or measurable outcomes, such as hourly pay, piece rates or sales commissions.  
As a consequence of their arm’s length and instrumental orientation these firms often hire and 
fire workers with a calculative rationality in response to changes in technology or market 
conditions (Jacoby & Mitchell 1990). Consequently, they present their employees with 
significant employment risk without the corresponding upside accorded senior executives 
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(Hoskisson & Turk 1990). Employees are likely to reciprocate their employer’s calculative 
rationality with respect to firm tenure, maintaining employment alternatives and developing 
generic, occupational and professional skills that increase their value on external labor 
markets(Waterman, Waterman, & Collard 1994). 
Intra-stakeholder conflicts between employees are evident under managerial governance 
where the principle of seniority mitigates some effects of labor market flexibility for employees 
with long tenure. Seniority is prevalent in the UK, USA and Canada where it is applied in 
practices related to lay-off, recall and promotions (Post, Preston, & Sachs 2002). Seniority 
backloads rewards for employees who commit themselves to idiosyncratic firm specific learning. 
However, seniority effects are most prevalent in declining and hypercompetitive industries such 
as airlines where two-tier wage systems are common (Heetderks & Martin 1991). Intra-
stakeholder conflicts are also evident between knowledge workers and routine employees. In 
these circumstances highly skilled and ‘star’ employees may be offered ‘pieces of the action’ 
(Rousseau & Shperling 2004) in the form of stock options and as a means of securing their 
continuing contribution.  
However, a contractual approach to employees provides managerially governed firms 
with skilled workers whom they may readily hire and fire. On the other hand, because employees 
may sell their services to the highest bidder, the prevailing wage for high performers and those 
offering scarce resources can be significantly higher than in systems where job security and firm 
tenure is more highly valued by employers and employees. Hence, employee stakeholder 
outcomes may rise and fall depending upon the urgency of the demand for their services but the 
variability of their outcomes stems from a secondary status in the stakeholder hierarchy 
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood 1997). 
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Equally, the firm-supplier relationship has been the subject of much transactions cost 
analysis and the competitive advantages of long-term cooperation is a virtue often extolled (Dyer 
& Singh 1998). Yet managerially governed firms are constrained in their capacity to privilege 
their supplier relationships. Consequently, the default position in such relations is that suppliers 
tend to be selected upon considerations of value, price and functional efficacy at the expense of 
other considerations (Dyer 1996). Professional managers are accountable to shareholders and it 
is difficult for them to justify tacit and extra-contractual commitments or partner selection upon 
relational or intuitive criteria (Mintzberg 1994). Contracts with suppliers, distributors and other 
partners tend to be formalized, precise and complex to account for foreseeable contingencies 
(Williamson, 1985). Contracts also tend to be discrete and pertain to clearly defined activities 
over a specified period (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). The precise terms will tend to reflect the 
relative bargaining power of the parties at a given point in time. The risk of shifting power and 
the potential for opportunism it creates manifests in a preference for joint ventures structured as 
autonomous third parties that are governed by clearly designed partnership agreements, carefully 
allocated property rights, value appropriation rules and clear exit options (Kogut 1988). Indeed, 
business partners may be considered as tradeable options {Folta, 2002 #11340} The potential for 
opportunism limits firms’ commitments to one another and leaves each to seek new 
buyer/suppliers and to transfer their business if better contractual returns are offered or if 
partners begin to falter in their performance. Managerial firms have sought to incorporate 
elements of the relational model into their supply chain management practices yet a highly 
calculative rationality prevails (Gereffi 2001). 
Creditors too possess only a secondary status in managerial governance since they are 
limited to a contractual stake in the firm. Creditors are exposed to the risk of opportunism, for 
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example through accelerated dividend payment schedules (Williamson, 1985). For instance, 
banks typically will establish long-term contracts that are secured against specific, earmarked 
assets holding a predictable residual market value (Copeland, 1986). Creditors have few rights of 
participation in managerial corporate governance indeed, U.S. legal doctrines impose costs on 
banks for participating in governance through board membership (Krosznera & Strahan 2001). 
Since creditors are confined to structuring debt contracts, they have little capacity to influence 
value allocation. Creditors may participate in corporate governance only in circumstances of 
distress, such as Chapter 11 style reorganizations, where creditors are granted rights to 
renegotiate contracts with several other stakeholders and where the risk of opportunism is 
intensified.  Generally, shareholder-creditor conflicts are more pronounced under managerial 
governance than in other corporate governance systems (Renneboog & Szilagyi 2008).  
4.2 Stakeholder outcomes under Stakeholder Governance 
Stakeholder governance, like its managerial counterpart, is characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control and an extensive use of professional salaried executives with 
little or no ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, the agency problem of 
managerial discretion constrained and limited by the embedding of executives in the network of 
relational contracts with a wider constituency of interests. The enduring nature of relational 
contracting often manifests itself in the cross ownership of patient, non-liquid equity (Dyer, 
1996). Consequently, executives are less accountable to and insulated somewhat from capital 
market pressures and their primary focus is on promoting stable and growing business relations 
between the organization and its key partners (Walsh & Seward 1990). As buyer/suppliers often 
own each other’s shares and have recurring commercial ties, there are multiple means of 
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monitoring and sanctioning top executives who perform their job poorly or who violate relational 
norms. 
Under stakeholder governance, capital and buyer/suppliers contributions are frequently 
bundled as partners may supply financial resources to a firm in the form of equity holdings, trade 
credit, loans and guarantees. In such circumstances, the economic significance of their equity 
ownership may be less significant than other linkages s (Gerlach 1992). A great strength of 
stakeholder governance is that it facilitates forging enduring ties between suppliers of capital and 
focal organizations. Central to these ties, is the mitigation of oversight from financial markets in 
exchange for “insider” status within the firm (Berglöf & Perotti 1994). As relations are 
conditioned by norms and incentives favoring long-term reciprocity, mutual support in the form 
of inter-temporal smoothing often takes place (Gerlach 1992). For instance, stronger partners 
may exercise forbearance in leveraging their superior bargaining power and may even prop up 
faltering buyer/suppliers through loans, or favorable contractual provisions because of the 
credible expectation that these actions will be reciprocated should the need arise (Allen & Gale 
2000). In Japan, financial institutions tend to bail-out firms that are part of their keiretsu and 
there is also an ongoing transfer of profitability from high to low performing firms in these 
networks (Gedajlovic & Shapiro 1998). Thus, contracting between firms operating under 
stakeholder governance tends to be much less discrete, formalized and less specific with respect 
to returns and performance expectations than those found under managerial governance. 
The underlying labor and managerial contract, at least for core employees, is similarly 
relational based upon enduring mutual commitment. The emphasis on growth and stability 
enhances job security inducing in employees a willingness to invest in companies specific skills 
(Hall & Soskice 2001). In return, stakeholder firms are less likely to use individual high-powered 
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incentives, more likely to use system rewards such as seniority, profit sharing and annual cash 
bonuses. To the extent that employees view the firm as an institution, they may evoke a 
normative orientation that encourages identification with the firm. Perceived labor-management 
goal congruence facilitates commitment to continuous improvement processes and self-directed 
team designs (Barker 1993).  In such a context, incentives rewarding loyalty and dependability 
are offered in the form of salaries tied to seniority and firm performance and there is less reliance 
on pay for performance incentive systems.  
Secondary stakeholders Relational contracting with insider stakeholders promotes goals 
of growth and stability. However, insider influence attenuates pressures to maximize market 
value to the detriment of equity investors who are relegated to secondary status. This occurs 
because the interests of equity investors can significantly diverge from suppliers of finance who 
are also buyer/suppliers. Contributors of finance, either through credit, equity or loan guarantees 
who are buyer/suppliers have multiple ways of benefiting from their association with the firm, 
but arm’s length suppliers of capital have only one (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002).  
For instance, shareholders-buyer/suppliers may take their benefits in the form of 
favorable trade arrangements and externalize the cost of those benefits onto arm’s length 
investors. Alternatively, insiders and buyer/suppliers may redistribute profit by transferring 
financial resources from more to less profitable firms thereby depriving arm’s length 
shareholders in high profits firms from a return on their investment. To the extent that arm’s 
length investors perceive this risk, it will be priced into the financial instrument and make raising 
capital on public markets more costly.  
Moreover, commitment to insiders however, also creates a set of incentives that favors 
organizational persistence over financial performance and risk aversion over risk taking (Meyer 
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1989). If managers and employees develop firm specific assets, their alternative employment 
opportunities are reduced and they are likely to prefer organizational survival to high-risk 
ventures that may threaten the firm’s existence. A similar rationale applies to dedicated suppliers 
or customers who intermesh their value chain with a focal organization. Thus ‘the interests of 
elite owners may be subordinated to the interests of non-elite dependent actors (Meyer and 
Zucker 1989:100) and are often sufficiently powerful to offset owners preference for improved 
financial performance. 
In the absence of incentives to shareholders, stakeholders tend to rely upon bank 
financing. However, banks too tend to favor a conservative business posture. As the suppliers of 
credit to a firm, banks have little incentive to fund high-risk projects. The nature of debt 
contracts limit their upside to the repayment of the principal and an agreed upon interest 
payment. On the other hand, if the project fails, they lose their investment. Since banks cannot 
profit from the upside return of highly successful projects, but bear the full costs of failed 
projects, bank debt is structurally unsuited to the high-risk uncertainties of lending to start-ups 
firms at the initial stages of a product life cycle (Prowse 1996).  
Stakeholder governance provides core employees with incentives to invest in developing 
deep firm specific skills (Hall & Soskice 2001), In return core employees are provided with 
internal rights such as employment security, career mobility and due process with an internal 
labor market. However, the establishment of stable internal and labor markets for core 
employees creates segmenting tendencies for non-core workers.  The latter face much poorer 
working conditions and bear the burden of product market uncertainty. Core employees have 
little incentive to share the stability they enjoy with the non-core employees(Doeringer & Piore 
1994). Instead, core employees tend to rationalize and legitimize their positions in terms of 
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superior skill and effort and institutionalize internal labor markets through collective action 
(Whittaker 1998).  Similarly, while stakeholder governance clearly privileges a core group of 
first-tier of buyer/suppliers research shows firms operating under stakeholder governance may 
also establish a second tier of dependent non-core firms (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan 2004). 
4.3 Stakeholder outcomes under family governance  
The global prevalence of concentrated ownership in large diversified conglomerates and 
business groups, especially in emerging markets, has produced a ‘principal-principal’ literature 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrohm, Bruton, & Jiang 2008)  that highlights the tension between majority 
and minority investors. On the one hand, because owner-managers exercise both managerial 
control and a direct claim on the firm's profits, they have a ‘high powered’ incentive to use 
resources efficiently (Alchian & Demsetz 1972). There is accumulating evidence to suggest that 
ownership by a founding entrepreneur who is also the firm CEO is strongly related to firm 
performance (Amit & Villalonga 2004; Anderson & Reeb 2003).  
On the other hand, high-powered owner incentives are effective only within a relatively 
limited range of ownership. Morck and Young (2003) suggest that family ownership below 10% 
provides inadequate incentives for efficiency, and ownership above 20% appears to generate 
negative performance effects. Negative effects arise from the probability that majority owners 
may use their control rights to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the large premiums are associated with superior voting 
shares and other control rights, and provide evidence that controlling shareholders seek to extract 
private benefits. Research from emerging markets suggests the probability of expropriation is 
particularly high in the absence of enforceable property rights for minority shareholders. There is 
now substantial evidence that closely held family firms pay an equity premium to compensate 
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arms-length minority investors for the risk that owner-managers may use their control rights to 
expropriate private benefits of control at their expense (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang 2000; La 
Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer 1999; Lins & Servaes 2002).  To mitigate the equity capital 
constraint family firms frequently engage in relational contracting with banks to assure access to 
growth capital. Long-term relationships with a main bank were instrumental in the emergence of 
diversified family owned business groups in Asia (Carney & Gedajlovic 2002).  
The primary beneficiaries of family governance are the entrepreneur, his/her kin, and a 
network of selected insiders. The accumulation of private wealth and its transmission to 
succeeding generations of the family is a primary value in capitalist societies.  The primacy of 
family is reflected in the view that the firm is an instrument of the entrepreneur and his or her 
family and is evident in what Chandler (1990) calls personally managed firms that demonstrate a 
preoccupation with wealth preservation.  The focus upon wealth preservation tends to be 
reinforced in succeeding generations where heirs to large family fortunes are less likely to fund 
innovative ventures, entrench their management and seek to preserve their wealth through 
political lobbying (Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung 1998). 
Kinship is one of several axes of social solidarity (Granovetter 2005) and owner 
managers may choose to favor those in their social networks, based on religious, linguistic, 
political or geographical solidarity, or others with whom they have a sense of affiliation or 
obligation. The concentration of authority in their hands of family business owners and their 
exemption from the checks and balances that are applied to professional managers in stakeholder 
and managerial governance provide owner managers with discretion to decide the social basis of 
transactions. The consequence is that stakeholder outcomes are likely to be highly particularistic 
reflecting the personal and idiosyncratic preferences of the owner manager (Carney 2005).  
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In this manner, the radius of trust (Fukuyama 1995) often extends beyond the family into 
a personal network of close partners who may become an associated category of beneficial 
stakeholders. Though owner-managers of family firms have a strong incentive to manage costs 
very tightly, they commonly form preferential business relations with specific customers and 
suppliers. In this regard, Uzzi (1997) notes that arms-length transactions are most frequently 
used by entrepreneurs, but they maintain close or special relations with a narrow range of 
partners. The comportment of owner-managers with respect to ‘ordinary’ and ‘favored’ 
customers and suppliers varies greatly. For instance, favored suppliers and customers may be 
offered preferential trade credit and access to goods in short supply (Uzzi 1997). Research on 
ethnic Chinese family entrepreneurship finds a preference for relational contracting in 
transactions related to ‘big deals’, extending credit or transferring a business, but most routine 
transactions are conducted through calculative and arm’s length contracts (Redding 1990).  
Secondary stakeholders Senior-executives, employees, and minority shareholders are a distant 
second behind family and buyer/suppliers in terms of outcomes.  Senior executives in owner-
managed firms typically have less discretion relative to managers in firms where there is a 
separation of ownership and control. Owner-managers have strong incentives to monitor their 
managerial agents closely making it difficult for them to divert resources into value destroying 
activities or by consuming organizational perquisites (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The 
personalized character of the owner-managed firm constrains its ability to offer high-powered 
incentives such as stock options to non-family members over concerns related to diluting family 
control and wealth. Third, non-family executives may face a glass ceiling since top positions are 
reserved for the children of the founders. Such practices can inject discord and a sense of 
inequity among the management team and can militate against recruiting and retaining highly 
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qualified external management. In fact, the inability to reward extremely high performance 
creates self-selection dynamics that may impede a firm’s ability to attract and retain high quality 
executives. Entrepreneur controlled firms must compensate professional managers for these 
deficiencies through increased cash compensation packages. Gomez-Meija, Larraza-Kintana and 
Makri, (2003) find that non-family professional CEOs in US family controlled public firms on 
average receive four times more income than CEOs who are family members.  
Similarly, employees are rarely accorded special standing because parsimony and 
particularism condition the rewards provided employees in systems of entrepreneurial 
governance. Since owners-managers appropriate residual returns, they can be exceedingly 
parsimonious in offering inducements to employees. In this regard, owner-managers can bring an 
ownership mentality to human resource decisions and often view compensation and benefits as 
expenses rather than investments. In general, labor costs in family businesses tend to be 
significantly lower than their non-family counterparts and they report spending less on training 
and career development programs than other firms do.  
In sum, relative to other governance systems, family governance privileges owners’ 
personal wealth and subordinates external capital in a way that creates a characteristic capital 
constraint. However, released from the constraints of the accountability to arms length investors 
and buyer/suppliers under managerial and stakeholder governance, owner managers are free to 
exhibit particular and idiosyncratic tendencies that produce a variety of organizational outcomes; 
thus family firms have simultaneously the highest mortality rates and are among the longest lived 




Governance systems weigh heavily and systematically in the manner through which 
stakeholder distributional outcomes are made and sustained. Because governance systems vary in 
terms of authority and contracting mode, they affect the legitimacy, power, and kinds of tensions 
stakeholders can expect to meet. Our comparative review of governance systems summarized in 
table two summarizes some of the intra-stakeholder tensions inherent in each system of 
governance.  
----------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------ 
 
While managerial governance highlights shareholder-manager conflicts, other conflicts 
are also evident under this system. Under stakeholder governance creditors, suppliers, and 
employees enjoy a primary stake while arms length equity investors endure a subordinate 
position. The expropriation of minority shareholder wealth under family governance has 
attracted the lion's share of attention; however, its concentration of authority tends to generate 
idiosyncratic stakeholder tensions. In this respect, and without entering into normative debates, 
governance viewed from an authority perspective may shed light upon the efficacy of 
mechanisms available to agents to reorder stakeholder outcomes.  
Two mechanisms suggest solutions to this problem: The first approach is to utilize 
‘market’ strategies that either increase the bargaining power of a group or undertake action to 
reduce dependence upon a focal firm by developing alternatives.  In many contexts it is given 
that stakeholders will leverage their relative power to improve their outcomes (Porter 1980). Yet 
the exercise of bargaining power must be seen as legitimate in the context within which it is 
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wielded. Sustained and illegitimate use of power, such as attempts to hold-up an organization, 
will tend to generate countervailing powers (Gelpi 2003). Consequently, norms and conventions 
tend to develop among frequently transacting parties that form part of the bargaining context 
(McNeil 1978) which tend to moderate and mediate the exercise of power. Indeed, institutional 
theorists take it as axiomatic that structures of power and authority are socially constructed and 
power relations will be context dependent. 
A second approach is to advance stakeholder interests collectively by seeking to 
influence the policy and legislative agenda and to encourage the state to develop legal protection 
for the rights of unprotected groups. This approach implies sustained processes of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Granovetter 2005) that require advocacy and legitimation of alternative models 
of firm governance and managerial practice.   
We have not in this paper been much concerned with the wealth generating effects of 
different governance systems. Advocates of the stakeholder model of corporate governance 
claim that zero sum contests can be converted into positive sum games due to the competitive 
advantages of more inclusive and egalitarian stakeholder management.  Because it mitigates the 
demands of capital and labor markets, stakeholder governance has attracted much attention. 
What is often advocated is the adoption of a stewardship approach in which managers are 
charged with a fiduciary responsibility to serve as a neutral coordinator of the contributions and 
returns of all stakeholders in the firm’ while promoting the overall well being of the firm. Such 
advocacy is well meaning, but overlooks the primacy and hierarchical nature of stakeholder 
claims in managerial governance. For example, Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) lament the failure 
of General Motors management to transfer high productivity cooperative labor management 
practices that were pioneered in a joint venture with Toyota and refined in the Saturn division 
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into other divisions due to multiple organizational conflicts and the absence of a strong legal 
foundation for stakeholder management. Pfeffer (1991) too vents frustration at American 
managers for their resistance to employee incentives such as profit sharing employee, stock 
ownership and knowledge-based pay despite accumulating evidence of their positive 
contribution to firm performance.  
Successful management practices that thrive in stakeholder governance systems are not 
easily accommodated without substantial modification in managerially governed firms 
(Gooderham, Nordhaug, & Ringdal 1999). Advocates of the stakeholder management model 
underestimate the historical origins of this governance system and the requirements for a 
complex institutional and legal architecture needed to support the model. The courts too have 
found it difficult to formulate and enforce ‘fiduciary duties of sufficient refinement to assure that 
managers behave more efficiently and fairly’ (Hansmann & Kraakman 2004). Stakeholder 
models in favor of better employee outcomes seem to flounder on the diversity of employee 
intertests, and the development of a unitary bargaining position seems elusive.  
5. Conclusion 
We propose that firms are arenas for conflict among rivalrous stakeholders. While much 
literature has focused upon the conflict between executives and the owners and stewards of 
capital and between executives and employees we have assembled and reviewed a disparate 
literature that directly and indirectly identifies numerous intra-stakeholder conflicts. Our 
intended contribution is to review governance conflicts from an authority perspective in a 
manner that reveals many intra-stakeholder conflicts as inherent within particular governance 
systems. Governance viewed in this way sheds light on a divergent shareholder value and 
stakeholder management literatures that have largely ceased to inform one another. The 
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implications of our view suggest no easy solutions for the myriad conflicts found in various 
systems of governance but we believe that stakeholder conflict viewed from this perspective may 
put future research on a firmer footing.    
While some scholars argue a corporate governance convergence thesis that suggests “the triumph 
of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now 
assured” (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2004:67) we are unconvinced and point to a growing 
literature suggesting continuing divergence in systems of governance around the world 
({Whitley, 1999 #8057}{Hollingsworth, 1997 #1671} {Guillen, 2001 #1674}{Khanna, 2003 
#2686}{ Consequently, understanding cross-national differences in distributional outcomes 
among and between stakeholder groups is likely to remain continuing focus for governance 
research. Moreover, as the varieties of capitalism literature has established ({Boyer, 2005 
#10972} Carney, 2009 #11168)} there is, within any particular nation state a plurality of 
institutional architectures that will support a diverse array of governance and organizational 
forms and we hope and suggest that stakeholder differences can be better appreciated through the 
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Table 2: Comparative corporate governance systems and stakeholder conflict 
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